Mahatma Gandhi (1869Gandhi ( -1948 is known for his political work in India and his weapon of non-violence. The demand for Indian independence dates from 1920 and springs from two coincidental causes: the agitation against the Rowlatt Act in India in 1918 and the fight to safeguard the temporal power of the Ottoman Sultan in Palestine at the end of World War 1. Gandhi was then involved in a non-violent jihad on behalf of the Ottoman Caliph to maintain Muslim rule over Palestine from 1918 to 1924. The movement became known as 'non-cooperation' and soon evolved into the first all-India satyagraha campaign for the independence of India. The campaign failed, the Caliphate collapsed, Gandhi's first incursion into the affairs of Palestine ended, but the non-violent jihad and its development raised Gandhi from a relative non-entity in Indian politics to the status of the most powerful personality in his country, second only to the Viceroy in India.
On the other hand, as the Caliph, the Sultan had the allegiance of Muslim Indians. As such, he was acknowledged not only as the spiritual but also as the temporal power over what is known as the Jazirat-ul-Arab. The 'Island of Arabia' extended as far as Iraq and Syria, and consequently Jerusalem, the third holiest place of pilgrimage after Mecca and Medina. Waters, so to say, encircled the Island: flowing waters from the Black Sea to the Agean Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the great Tiger and Euphrates rivers -or even the Caspian Sea. Indian Muslims, religiously and passionately concerned about the Caliphate, refused to accept the loss of temporal power over the holy shrines. Known as Khilafatists, the activists pursued their fight, up to 1924, when the Caliphate was abolished and Turkey became a secular Republic under the rule of Ataturk.
Third paradox
There is even a third paradox, in that the jihad apparently took no account of the Zionist cause and the Balfour Declaration.
Yet the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 envisaged "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" and promised to use the British Government's "best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object". (Note 3)
This statement of policy antedates the start of the Caliphate's agitation for maintaining the Constantinople Caliph's temporal rule on the Holy Land . Neither the Indian Muslims nor Gandhi realised at the time that the seed of the State of Israel had been sown in Palestine by the Balfour Declaration. Moreover, Gandhi, though well acquainted with South African Jews, did not seem to be so with Zionist views. The reason may be that his knowledge of Zion was fed more fundamentally by Christian influence, with its emphasis on the celestial Jerusalem. (Note 4)
The Indian Muslims were barking up the wrong tree as they realised some fifteen years later. From December 1919 right up to September 1923 the Indian National Congress had continued to pass pious resolutions in support of Turkey. It was only after Ataturk's abolition of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924 that the Indian National Congress resigned itself to the fait accompli. (Note 5) For instance, at the end of December 1922 at its 37 th session at Gaya, the Congress carried a resolution entitled 'Congratulations to the Turks'. This demanded the "effective guardianship of Islam and the Jazirat-ul-Arab, freed from all non Muslim control", endorsing thereby the views of the All-India Congress Committee resolution at Calcutta (20-24 November 1922), which had threatened to act: …"unless the Jazirat-ul-Arab are freed from all non Muslim control…" As late as 15 September 1923 at the special Delhi session the Congress expressed its hopes in a resolution entitled 'Turkish victory', interpreting the success of Ataturk "as a sure presage of the removal of all alien control from the Jazirat-ul-Arab …"
Congress ceased supporting Turkey only in 1924, but its interest in Palestine was resumed after the Arab rebellion of 1936-1939, and its concern was expressed in renewed resolutions, this time entitled "Palestine", concentrating on the theme of the Arab-Jewish conflict.
Same root, but a different tree, not Turkish this time, but Jewish (See Panter-Brick, 2008).
The profile of underdeveloped Ottoman Palestine

Not yet a nation
Muslim Indians and Gandhi might have been barking up the wrong tree in 1919, but they believed that they were defending their territory, the territory of the Caliph against the same crusader, British colonialism. General Allenby and his troops had conquered Palestine from the Turks and entered Jerusalem in December 1917. This military occupation was to lead to the Mandate of Palestine. Palestine, thus, after World War I, became a focus of Gandhi's political activity and from there one can trace a progression to his demand for Indian independence in 1920. (Note 6) In the wartime days leading to the demise of the Ottoman Empire and its dismemberment, and in the following decade, what came to be designated as the Mandated territory of Palestine was a forlorn, neglected, derelict province under Turkish rule, a backwater, a country living in relative peace with the outside world and with the different religious communities at home. Jews and Christians had paid their taxes and so, were left to get on with their lives and worship as they wanted. The seed of the Jewish problem was still latent, not yet of any significance. Ottoman rule showed tolerance to infidels.
Jews had been coming in two waves called alyas, in the 1880s and shortly before World War I, mainly from Yemen and Russia. Many had settled down, accounting for one in ten of the population, causing no disturbance to local employment or to the subsistence economy. They joined the small number of original Jews, who had survived centuries of persecution and displacement. More wanted to come. Theodor Herzel, who had prophesied at the end of the nineteenth century the State of Israel to incredulous ears, had been negotiating with the Sultan, albeit unsuccessfully, for the settlement of more Jews. But the war made things difficult for them. Many had kept their old nationality. Many were of Russian origin. Now that the Sultan was at war with Russia, they were faced with a difficult choice: asking for Ottoman citizenship on account of their long residence in the Holy Land -and in time of war that choice meant conscription in the Turkish army -or being considered as enemies of the State. (Note 7)
Feudal society and economics
At the time, Palestine was not a nation. There was no national consciousness as we understand it today, not in an organised way. No political parties. No representation. No recognised leaders. Its boundaries were all too vague. From the Gulf, Palestine stretched east of the river Jordan and north into Syria. Indeed, it was usually considered a part of a vague political entity called Greater Syria. The inhabitants of these regions, estimated to be less than a million, and their lands, were coveted by Arab neighbours. Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, rebelled against the Turks, for the promise, made to him by the British in 1915, of an independent kingdom -promise which, in his view, included Palestine. Consequently, he made himself king of Syria after the war, but was excluded from ruling also in Palestine by Britain, and he was later ejected even from Syria by the French Mandatory power. The dream of a Greater Syria never materialised. But Hussein's son was given Jordan; Iraq and Lebanon were mandated to Britain and France respectively. Thus the Mandate of Palestine moulded the contours of a new country Palestine.
The social organisation of the country was best described as feudal. The economy, accordingly, had remained stagnant since the Middle Ages: small towns; ancient harbours, as in Roman times, open to the wider world by sea -but there was no Jewish Tel-Aviv yet to compete with Arab Jaffa. Communications by land were primitive. Caravans passed through. Banking, education, health were mere words. No infrastructure to sustain the economy. No industrial revolution to speak of. Even agriculture, in that propitious climate, was handicapped by the lack of water and irrigation. The Jews were to provide all that -to themselves -as bankers, industrialists, and agriculturalists with new pioneering methods. Jewish settlements brought to the land, what the Cistercian abbeys had done to Europe in the past. The Jews made the desert bloom.
The land belonged to a landed gentry. These landed families controlled the lives of the peasants working their estates. As Zionist funds were used to buy land for Jewish settlements, new ownership sometime entailed the eviction of tenants, whose families had been tending the land for centuries. Because the Jews insisted on giving employment preferably to their own coreligionists, Arab discontent was soon to grow, first in the countryside, then in the towns. This discontent fed and watered the seed of Palestinian nationalism. It was channelled by the large families, which then competed for the leadership of political life. But it took nearly two decades to build up a powerful nationalist party, at the head of a resistance movement, aimed, not only at the Jews but also at the British.
The Caliph and Muslim India
The cry of 'Islam in danger'
Sponsoring -uninvited -less than one million Arabs of Palestine and reminding them -unsuccessfully -of their religious duty, more than seventy million Muslims in India were expressing distress and anger at the possible loss of control over their sacred shrines. The Ulemas, their religious leaders, inspired and inflamed the protests; Indian Muslim politicians voiced the malcontents; the Viceroy was forewarned by his Muslim Counsellors of the rebellion to come, the first since the Mutiny of 1857. His Excellency was told that the Muslims fighting in the Indian Army for British victory in the Middle East were being betrayed, if their meaningful contribution to the war served the dismemberment of Turkey. He was also reminded of the promise of the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, during the war, not to carve up the stable, if autocratic state, of the Ottoman Empire.
For Indian Muslims, it was "a religious question… Saving the Ottoman Empire thus became synonymous with the saving of Islam, the whole thing boiled down to the issue of the custody of the holy places and keeping the Jazirat-ul-Arab free from the influence of non-Muslims." (Note 8) Gandhi summed up the issue in three respects. The first concerned the continuation of the Caliphate and the new boundaries of Turkey. The second considered the future of Mecca and Medina. The third centred on Palestine. The ensuing claim was put in clear and simple terms: that "pre-war status should be restored". (Note 9)
Because the spiritual and temporal rule of the Caliph were linked indissolubly in the minds of Indian Muslims (a situation not unlike that of the Papacy in the fifteenth century), because their spiritual leader was the very Caliph of Turkey, and also because the main unifying force of their different and diverse Muslim communities was religion, the issue became strong and vital, with the unmanly prospect of living under an emasculated Caliph and a dishonoured religion. Hence the cries of hijrat and of jihad.
The mobilization of Indian Muslims
Jihad has become a familiar term: not so, hijrat. This means the injunction to leave a place committed to evil (Darul-Harb) -in this case India under 'satanic' British rule -to escape to the purity of another Islamic country (Darul-Islam) -in this case Afghanistan. Truly enough, 18,000 Muslims, obeying the call of their religious local leaders, trekked from Sindh and the North-West Frontier Province to Afghanistan in the month of August 1921. (Note 10) Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, later dubbed the 'Frontier Gandhi', was one of them. He reached Kabul. Others were refused entry, because they had no credentials and had to retrace their steps. Many died on the way from exposure, deprivation and exhaustion. "All told, there is reason to believe that half a million Muslims took the road to Afghanistan", writes H.N. Brailsford. (Note 11) The hijrat proved a tragedy. A locally organised jihad on the Malabar Coast proved equally disastrous. In July 1921 the Moplahs had risen in rebellion against the authorities with the objective of establishing a 'khilafat kingdom'. For good measure they killed their Hindu landlords as well. The rebellion was put down at great cost. The Moplah 'king' was captured in January 1922 and shot; about 50,000 of his followers were either killed and wounded or taken prisoners, court-martialled and shot. (Note 12) A third alternative was Gandhi's non-cooperation strategy, namely a widespread boycott of Government sponsored activities. He persuaded some key Muslim leaders that the Koran approved of his own interpretation of a non-violent resistance. His lead offered some hope of success, at least the only hope.
The choice of strategy
Gandhi had to deal with two dedicated 'Khilafatists', the Ali Brothers, who accepted non-violence in deeds and in words, but not in thoughts, and only as a temporary measure. That was the extent of their understanding with Gandhi. M.A. Jinnah, who ten years later became the 'Great Leader' of the Indian Muslims, stayed resolutely out of the deal: he did not approve of the unconstitutional means that were the stock in trade of Gandhi's non-violence. However, they all knew of Gandhi's exploits in Transvaal and Natal. They knew of his devotion to Hindu-Muslim unity. They knew of his successes in circumstances where others could not have achieved any. Hence, Mohamed and Shaukat Ali welcomed Gandhi, not simply as a companion, but as their Commander-in-Chief, refraining as best they could from the fiery and inflammatory speeches they were used to making. (There was a notable lapse for which they had to recant). Mahatma Gandhi -as he was now addressed by his followers (Note 13) -embraced them as his 'blood brothers', having fallen in love with them 'at first sight'. 
Gandhi's rise to power through the Caliphate issue
Gandhi's rise to the leadership of Indian Muslims
Gandhi, having secured Muslim approval and following, then sought to bring the Hindus on board. Saad Khairi sums up his position at the time, as a "guide, philosopher and supreme commander (of the Muslims): he was drafting their resolutions; he was corresponding with the Viceroy on their behalf; he was planning and directing their Non-cooperation Movement; and he was negotiating with Hindu leaders to join the Movement. It was indeed as the leader of the Muslims that Gandhi held talks with the Hindus. Until then Gandhi had neither any strong position nor any platform. He was just an individual, respected no doubt, but without any organized support behind him. All his satyagrahas up to that time had been as an individual; the Muslims gave him an issue, solid support and a powerful political position." (Note 15)
Gandhi put the issue of the Caliphate in terms of 'duty' to their fellow Indians: actually not a very convincing argument. The British Government kindly came to the rescue. It did so in successive ways. It raised the all-India level of political sensitivity by forcing on the unwilling Indians the anti-terrorist Rowlatt Act in March 1919. Gandhi took the lead in the Rowlatt agitation, whipping up protests and demonstrations, across India. The Government's response was to impose martial law in the Punjab, which had been set aflame by the Rowlatt Act. This led to the massacre near Amritsar of an unarmed gathering in that same month, causing horror and indignation, again India-wide. Finally -a timely master stroke for Gandhi's benefit! -in May 1920, the British Government made known the terms of the Sèvres Treaty depriving Turkey of the holy places of pilgrimage, and in the same month, "whitewashed" the Amritsar tragedy by publishing the unsatisfactory Hunter Report on the Punjab troubles. All Gandhi had to do in June 1920 was to mobilise anti-government feeling, and to tour the country with the Ali Brothers, raising the cry of 'Khilafat wrong' to Muslims and 'Punjab wrong' to Hindus, preaching his remedy of non-cooperation, while the Ali Brothers raised the cry of Islam in danger.
Nonetheless, Hindu support for the Caliphate remained hesitant. Gandhi had still to persuade the Indian National Congress, which was marking time, that the preservation of the Ottoman Caliphate was "the question of questions". (Note 16) Spurred by his Muslim allies, Gandhi would not wait. He launched his Campaign of Non-cooperation on 1 August 1920, hoping it would be endorsed by the Congress as a fait accompli, in September. This entailed mainly the boycott of law courts, schools, universities, official functions, liquor shops and foreign cloth.
Gandhi's rise to the leadership of the Indian National Congress
At the Special Session of the Indian National Congress convened for that purpose in September 1920 at Calcutta, Gandhi won the day, but on condition that the decision would be confirmed at the 1920 December full session of the Congress at Nagpur. There, Gandhi convinced most delegates (only one in fourteen were Muslims) to join the fight of the Indian Muslims. He went further, demanding swaraj, that is independence, and envisaged it 'within one year'. At his request the Congress constitution was amended to include breaking the law and refusing to pay taxes. Thus the means of achieving independence was changed from 'constitutional means' to 'by all peaceful and legitimate means'. "The Congress had virtually become an extension of the Khilafat Committee." (Note 17)
The great poet Tagore commented that the promise of 'swaraj in one year' made non-cooperation irresistible. In Nagpur Gandhi became Congress and the Congress became Gandhi for years to come. At the next December session at Ahmedabad, he was appointed 'the sole executive authority of the Congress', with the power of nominating his successor. In August 1920 he had launched a policy of non-cooperation with the British establishment. In December 1921 he planned a more aggressive campaign of non-violent civil disobedience. He had, solidly behind him, the support of Muslim India and of Hindu India. The Ali Brothers had been sentenced to two years' imprisonment in October 1921, but the Government seemed too scared to arrest Gandhi, at the apex of his power.
The downfall of the Caliph and the undoing of Hindu-Muslim unity
The collapse of the campaign
"The most foolish of all foolish schemes" was the Viceroy's comment on Gandhian strategy. Foolishly or not, many Indians had left Government service, the law courts, schools and universities, and had returned their medals. The boycott of foreign cloth lit bonfires of Manchester cotton all through the year 1921. The non-payment of taxes was to follow.
Gandhi sent the Viceroy an ultimatum on 1 February 1922, giving notice of the impending civil disobedience. Then, astonishingly, he changed his mind. On 12 February 1922, satyagraha was suspended, following an ugly incident in the remote village of Chauri-Chaura earlier that month.
Gandhi consulted no one before taking this momentous decision. His co-workers were shocked and dismayed. Now that Hindu-Muslim unity had been achieved, they were spoiling for a fight to the finish. Instead, the movement ran out of steam; Gandhi was arrested and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.
The collapse of the Caliphate
For the sake of the Caliph Gandhi was now in prison, cut off from influencing the course of events. He watched from his cell the world go by. He would ponder on past events, select his Experiments with Truth for his Autobiography and wait expectantly. While he was thus meditating on the developments of his non-violent jihad, the Turks themselves took the initiative.
Nine months after Gandhi's arrest, and only seven months after the Indian National Congress at their special Delhi session congratulated the Turks on their 'victory' as 'the sure presage of the removal of all alien control from the Jazirat-ul-Arab', the Sultan was obliged to flee, Turkey having been made a Republic on 29 October 1923. He was replaced by a relative. The new Caliph kept his spiritual authority, but was deprived of his temporal power. Worse was to come.
Gandhi was released early, in February 1924, following a surgical operation. Within a month, the Caliphate issue was settled for good. The 3 March of that year saw the deposition of the Caliph, a victim of Ataturk's secular, republican ideology. To quote H.N. Brailsford: "While Indian Muslims, under the dynamic leadership of the Ali brothers, were reviving the romantic, old-world traditions of Islamic theocracy, the Turks, in whose interests they believed they were acting, were tossing it aside as medieval lumber." (Note 18)
The Indian Muslim dream had ended in a nightmare. In disbelief, the Khilafatists resolved to send a Muslim deputation to Turkey, but they were refused passports. Their organisation, the Khilafat Conference, could do little more than debate the re-establishment of a Caliph. (Note 19) Seizing the opportunity, Hussein, the sharif of Mecca who had led the war-time rebellion against the Turks in the Arabian peninsula and had crowned himself king of 'Greater Syria' in 1920, now proclaimed himself Caliph on the 5 March 1924. In Muslim India, his proclamation fell on deaf ears, as Hussein was considered a stooge of the British. Thus the debate continued and there is still no Caliph today.
The breaking of Indian-Muslim unity
Gandhi quietly washed his hands of the Caliphate issue that same year, still hoping, intently, to save his top priority, Hindu-Muslim unity. He distanced himself from the Muslim claims on Palestine, while trying to stay close to the Ali
